



Abstract. Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at St I.2.3 is one 
which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I  shall argue that 
there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as 
an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and 
look at two critical responses to his views (those of bonJour and boghossian). If 
one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes 
a hybrid position on the epistemology and metaphysics of an anti-naturalistic 
stance, it turns out to be the position Aquinas himself takes on meaning and 
knowledge.
I. AQuINAS’S reSPoNSe to NAturAlISm
Aquinas presents two objections to the existence of God in his 
celebrated five ways discussion. The first is the problem of evil, the 
second the problem of naturalism. As he states the second it sounds 
like an application of ockham’s razor, that is, a principle of intellectual 
parsimony. When causes fully account for something, we don’t need to 
postulate more. but the natural world has natural causes and human 
intervention to explain all the phenomena contained in it, so no further 
cause is required. As laplace would put it six centuries later ‘we have no 
need of that hypothesis’. Aquinas’s response is to argue that natural and 
human causation do not exhaust the causal story and one is led to a first 
cause which is unchanging and which of itself must be. The response 
connects directly to the corpus of the article, with its arguments for a first 
cause and with associated texts in the Summa Contra Gentiles and the 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. but modern naturalists would 
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not be moved by this dialectical strategy, since basic to their position 
is a methodological objection to the possibility of making such a move 
as Aquinas’s. There is not the possibility of an appeal to a higher science 
than those exhibited in the natural sciences and various arguments are 
presented to make this case. Simply asserting that there is such a science 
would be met with disbelief. michael rea, in a recent book on naturalism, 
notes that the majority of contemporary philosophers (at least in the 
english-speaking world) are naturalists, although exhibiting a  high 
degree of variegation in how they view it; ‘it enjoys the lofty status of 
academic orthodoxy’.1
Aquinas’s views on the methods and nature of the sciences are 
contained in summary in St question 1, in greater detail in his 
commentary on boethius’s De Trinitate and in the commentary on 
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.2 He endorses Aristotle’s deductive method, 
defends a form of foundationalism, argues dialectically for the necessity 
of intellectual first principles, has a  hierarchical conception of the 
sciences, distinguishes practical and speculative science, uses the idea 
of subalternated science, distinguished the formal and material aspects 
of scientific inquiry. Among the features I’d like to note includes the 
systematicity of his views. His account of cognition in the individual, 
the relation of sense to intellect, the different workings of the intellect, 
dovetail with the account of the differences between disciplines, but also 
with the way intellectual disciplines constitute habits of mind directed to 
the goals of human existence. typically these issues are treated as distinct 
in subsequent discussions – indeed philosophy of science, epistemology, 
moral psychology and issues about human destiny are rarely considered 
together in contemporary academia. 
The contemporary intellectual world is therefore less integrated than 
the one presented by Aquinas. but it also poses important challenges 
1 michael rea, World Without Design, oxford, ouP, 2002, p. 1
2 Following standard convention I shall refer to Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae by part, 
question and article. His views on scientia are in St Ia q.1. The notes in the blackfriars 
edition, Vol.1 edited by Thomas Gilby, are extensive and useful. The english translation 
by timothy mcDermott of The Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate is excellent, in 
Aquinas Selected Philosophical Writings, oxford: ouP, 1993 pp. 1-50. For a good english 
translation of the Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics see that by richard 
berquist, Notre Dame: Dumb ox books, 2007.
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to the methodology used by him. Naturalism as a  recognisable 
phenomenon clearly was a possibility considered by Aquinas, but it was 
the 19th century when it became a genuine contender as a worldview. 
The kind of skepticism about speculative reason exhibited by Hume, the 
advances in the physical sciences, the kind of ideology shown by Comte, 
all generated a  momentum which flourished in the ideals of scientific 
philosophy expressed by Frege and russell which were deepened and 
refined by Carnap and Quine. In this, Quine stands as a  watershed. 
The development of cognitive science, the work of naturalists such 
as Dennett, the Churchlands, the Kitchers, Devitt, all flow from his 
conception of the lack of principled distinction between natural science 
and philosophical reason. This is a  powerful current in contemporary 
philosophy and reverberates more broadly in the popular works of 
Dawkins and Dennett. So is Aquinas’s work merely a  chapter in the 
history of ideas or can it engage with contemporary naturalism? It seems 
to me that Aquinas has the resources to challenge some of the arguments 
of the naturalists and indeed various contemporary anti-naturalistic 
philosophers are developing positions which look curiously familiar to 
those who know Aquinas. In the following sections I  shall discuss the 
naturalism of Carnap and Quine, especially in relation to the notion of 
analyticity, examine some responses to Quinean naturalism and then 
compare these to Aquinas’s account of mind and language. His position 
is robust enough to work as a viable alternative to naturalism, and is not 
at all dissimilar to contemporary anti-naturalistic positions.
II. CArNAP AND QuINe oN NAturAlISm
If Quine is the most influential theorist of naturalism in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, Carnap is the most important influence on him. 
recent studies of Carnap emphasize the neo-Kantian constitutive aspect 
of his work and play down the simple-minded verificationist caricature 
popularized by Ayer.3 one can think of his work as a  continuation of 
3 See for example michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1999; Alan richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World: 
The Aufbau and Emergence of Logical Empiricism, Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1997; michael Friedman and richard Creath, The Cambridge Companion to 
Carnap, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2007.
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the Neo-Kantian project to clarify the a  priori aspects of inquiry in 
a linguistic register.4 He was influenced by Frege to value formal language 
and the need for a perspicuous system of representation, believing that 
many problems of philosophy are spuriously generated by the illusions of 
language. russell supplied him with the model of scientific philosophy, 
Wittgenstein with a  linguistic account of logical truth and logical 
consequence. He was reacting against nineteenth century German 
Idealism, despairing that sentences such as ‘The Absolute is identical 
with itself ’ could be clarified, argued about or given truth values. His 
early work was on the idea of space, making sense of the developments 
of relativity theory, followed by an attempt to work out rigorously, using 
the logic of Principia Mathematica, an account of sense knowledge on 
the model of russell’s Our Knowledge of the External World – this was 
The Logical Structure of the World (1927). Following this was a turn to the 
nature of logical and mathematical truth in The Logical Syntax of Language 
(1934). Carnap defended the use of linguistic rules to constitute logical 
calculi, developing notions of truth, consequence and proof relative to 
these languages. The task of the philosopher is to develop this formal 
apparatus, which first order workers in mathematics, applied logic, 
philosophy of science and the sciences in general would use. Central to 
this project is the idea of analyticity. An analytic proposition is one made 
true by the rules of the linguistic framework, a  synthetic one is made 
true by the world. Philosophy has a clear method – the use of linguistic 
frameworks, translating and analysing unclear natural language notions 
into highly tooled artificial concepts which can be applied scientifically. 
Philosophy doesn’t articulate truths about the world, but aids science in 
doing that. The constraints on the use of formal languages are pragmatic 
– what the working scientist finds congenial and helpful to use. A clear 
statement of this can be found in “empiricism, Semantics and ontology” 
(1950).5 Carnap’s work has strands of empiricism, pragmatism and Neo-
Kantianism woven together within the guiding principle of the linguistic 
4 See his own account of the roots of his work in “Intellectual Autobiography” in The 
Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Schilpp P. (ed.), la Salle, open Court, 1963, pp. 3-84.
5 “empiricism, Semantics and ontology”, Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 4 
no. 11, (1950), pp. 20-40. (reprinted as Appendix A to Meaning and Necessity, 2nd. edn., 
Chicago: Chicago university Press, 1956).
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turn in philosophy. unlike Wittgenstein’s approach to language, Carnap 
was a technician, avoiding natural languages and seeing the core role of 
philosophy as the production of carefully honed linguistic frameworks 
which would facilitate the answering of those questions which can be 
answered, and the avoidance of those which cannot. but like Wittgenstein 
he thought that language leads one astray and that metaphysics is 
a linguistic fiction, mistaking the form of representation for the matter 
conveyed by that form.
Quine was an early advocate of Carnap’s approach to philosophy, 
which seemed to fit well with American pragmatism.6 He gave lectures in 
Harvard in the mid-1930’s defending the approach which took analyticity 
as central. His “truth by Convention” of 1936 is typically read in the 
light of his subsequent repudiation of analyticity, but is better seen as still 
internal to the analyticity project, dealing with internal tensions in it.7 
Particularly that paper probes the problem of how a notion of analyticity 
might ground logical truth without presupposing it. However, the main 
break comes with “two Dogmas of empiricism” (1950).8 There, Quine 
examines the different possible ways analyticity might be explicated 
and finds them all wanting. He is dubious about the notion of meaning, 
construed as sense. one can work with an idea of reference, or extension, 
but intensions are opaque. Ideas of conceptual containment are merely 
metaphorical. Carnap’s use of linguistic rules is rejected as ad hoc. 
Definitions rely on pre-existing linguistic practice and cannot themselves 
explain that practice. 
There’s much interpretative debate about Quine’s exact target and his 
purpose in this celebrated paper.9 It seems important to distinguish the 
6 Dear Carnap, Dear Van, Creath, r., (ed.), berkeley: university of California Press, 
1990.
7 “truth by Convention”, Philosophical Essays for A.N. Whitehead, lee, o., (ed.), New 
York: longmans, 1936, pp. 90-124. (reprinted in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, 
New York: random House, 1966, pp. 77-106).
8 “two Dogmas of empiricism”, Philosophical Review 60, (1951), pp. 20-43. (reprinted 
in From a  Logical Point of View, Cambridge, ma: Harvard university Press, 1953, 
pp. 20-46).
9 See for example, W.V. Quine “two Dogmas in retrospect”, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 21 no. 3, (1991), p. 265-274; H. Putnam, “two Dogmas revisited” in 
Realism and Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1983.
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semantic question about how to make the analytic/synthetic distinction, 
from the epistemological question of the a priori/a posteriori distinction, 
from the metaphysical question of the necessary/contingent distinction. 
These are often elided, but they are distinct. Quine attacks the semantic 
distinction between analytic and synthetic, but as a way of challenging the 
epistemological distinction between a priori and a posteriori. Analyticity 
seems the only way to explicate the a priori. An a priori proposition is 
one justified independently of the senses – analyticity explains how this 
is so using linguistic rules. Hence by attacking the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, Quine also attacked the a  priori/a  posteriori. Indeed the 
necessary-contingent also fell, since logical necessity rested also on 
analyticity.
by attacking the sharp analytic-synthetic distinction and replacing it 
with the idea of a continuum – sentences which are very closely linked 
to observation and sentences far removed from observation - Quine 
presented a different conception of philosophy to what had gone before. 
There are no neutral pure observation sentences, there are no pure 
theoretical observation-free sentences. by being linguistic, observation 
sentences are contaminated by theory. by being part of our web of 
belief, logical, mathematical and general scientific beliefs are connected 
to observation. We are reluctant to alter logical and mathematical 
beliefs because of the knock-on effect, but this is in principle possible 
(for example dropping some of the classical logical laws in discussing 
quantum phenomena might make for more elegant theories). Quine 
has articulated a picture of knowledge which is empiricist, coherentist, 
pragmatist and most importantly naturalist. There is no first philosophy 
which either gives a  foundation to science or clarifies it from without. 
Philosophy is part of the ongoing quest for truth, but has no special 
method which distinguishes it from other parts of that question – it is 
self-reflective science (including the humanities and social sciences 
in this characterisation of science). He repeats Neurath’s image of the 
human quest for knowledge as akin to sailors on a ship who are forced 
to continuously use the ship to stay afloat, but who can replace broken 
bits one at a  time. For Quine, everything is revisable, but only against 
a critical mass of stability.
This kind of naturalism is primarily methodological. The methods by 
which truth is acquired are those of science broadly construed. There is 
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no pure a priori method which rivals that of science. Quine is a physicalist 
rather than a materialist. Physicalists accept the ultimate theory of the 
world to be that delivered by physics – so it is revisable and ongoing. 
Quine’s actual ultimate ontology is something like a  neo-pythagorean 
picture, where mathematical sets provide the most tractable account of 
the world. but if science licenced clairvoyance or immortal souls, then 
these would be incorporated into the ontology. to look for a grounding 
for science is to seek what cannot be given, there is no Cartesian bedrock. 
While there are many debates about the details of Quine’s views10, this 
picture has proved enormously influential – pragmatic, fallibilist, fruitful 
in terms of the interactions of philosophers with psychologists, linguists, 
neurologists, biologists and so on. The contemporary explorations of 
consciousness which are multi-disciplinary are the fruit of such a view.
However, not everyone is sanguine about this development. Some 
worry about the further developments of Quine’s work. For example there 
is the doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation, that there are no facts 
of the matter about meaning. There is Quine’s famous dismissal of modal 
notions. His account of the mental is famously austere and behaviourist. 
Dennett mischievously defines the verb ‘to quine’ in his dictionary as to 
deny the existence of something obvious and important (self-consciously 
ironically, given Dennett’s Quinean view of consciousness).11 I want to 
discuss two critical reactions to Quine’s work. The first, from laurence 
bonJour, worries that Quine presents a  corrosive skepticism about 
reason; the second, from Paul boghossian, worries that Quine presents an 
incoherent skepticism about meaning. both suggest correctives to Quine. 
my argument is that there are problems with both of their positions, but 
adjusted and amalgamated they make an attractive response to Quine. 
However, this amalgam turns out to already exist and it is the position 
defended by Aquinas.
10 See for example, r.F. Gibson, The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, tampa: university of 
South Florida Press, 1982; C. Hookway, Quine, oxford: Polity Press, 1987, A. orenstein, 
W.V.O. Quine, Chesham: Acumen, 2002; G. Kemp, Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
london: Continuum, 2006; P. Hylton, Quine, london: routledge, 2007.
11 See http://www.philosophicallexicon.com. He also defines “aquinas, n.pl. (from 
a-,  not, and quine) Philosophers who refuse to deny the existence or importance of 
something real or significant”.
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III. reACtIoNS to QuINe
lawrence bonJour defended a robust conception of the a priori rooted 
in rational intuition against moderate and extreme empiricists in his 
In Defence of Pure Reason (1998).12 For him, Carnap counts as a moderate 
empiricist and Quine as an extreme one. moderate empiricists have an 
attenuated account of the a priori and modal knowledge by their doctrines 
of analyticity and conventionalism, whereas extreme ones reject any notion 
of the a priori. bonJour challenges various accounts of analyticity used to 
underpin the moderate empiricist position.13 His fundamental problem 
is that the notion does not do the epistemological or metaphysical work 
required of it. Certain versions of it straightforwardly rely on a pre-existing 
account of logical truth (what he calls reductive accounts). Hence these 
cannot serve as explanations of logical truth. other versions obfuscate 
and disguise their question-begging, relying on hidden appeals to the 
a  priori or to necessity. He notes that conventionalism cannot explain 
logical truth (conventions are freely chosen, logic is not). Crucially he 
wonders about the very status of the moderate empiricist claim. Since it 
is not an empirical claim, is it therefore analytic and conventional? If so, 
what then is its dialectical force, since conventions are supposed to be 
harmless and noncontentious? Finding the moderate empiricist position 
unclear, unmotivated, and unimpressive, he turns then to the Quinean 
position.
It seems to him that Quine’s rejection of analyticity is rooted in 
epistemology. Quine really wants to jettison the a  priori, which he 
understands as defending the view that there are unrevisable true 
propositions. but bonJour wonders: why not allow for a fallible conception 
of the a  priori? Consider complicated calculations. Anomalies occur, 
checking is carried out and the calculation is amended. Such a procedure 
is canonically a priori if anything is (since no empirical input is required), 
but is also corrigible. Given that Quine devotes much effort to attack 
unrevisability, bonJour seeks to separate the issue of the a priori (beliefs 
not justified by experience) from revisability. A different argument is to 
query the very status of the naturalistic claim. It can’t be based on a priori 
12 lawrence bonJour, In Defence of Pure Reason, Cambridge: CuP, 1998 (hereafter DPr)
13 DPr, pp. 28ff
AQuINAS AND NAturAlISm 377
reasoning, on pain of contradiction, but if it rests solely on assuming 
that reason consists in adjusting one’s beliefs to experience, it assumes its 
conclusion illegitimately. 
In opposing Quine, bonJour defends the Aristotelian notion of 
nous, rational intuition (also defended by russell). Part of his dialectical 
strategy is to dismiss alternative accounts. His positive account relies on 
the phenomenology of cases where one considers a fundamental logical 
or conceptual truth, and ‘sees’ its validity. This is direct, immediate, 
non-discursive. It can be assimilated with the idea of ‘true-in-virtue 
of meaning’ – except here the epistemological work is being done by 
appeal to a  faculty of reason rather than the conventionalism of the 
logical empiricists. bonJour argues that rational intuition of this kind 
yields insight into the nature of reality – the modal structure of the 
world. He explicitly acknowledges that this will require some account of 
intentionality in which concepts reflect the metaphysical structure of the 
world – and appeals to Aquinas as a model for such an account. I shall 
return to this below.
Paul boghossian challenges Quine on different grounds, fearing that 
Quine’s view results in a  corrosive form of skepticism about meaning. 
opposing Quine he defends a  form of analyticity, articulating this 
position in his 1997 paper “Analyticity”. boghossian distinguishes 
different kinds of analyticity. Frege-Analyticity is that which assumes 
pre-existing logical truth (like bonJour’s reductive account). Carnap-
Analyticity on the other hand doesn’t rely on logical truth, but grounds 
logical truth itself. boghossian holds that Quine’s arguments are 
effective against Frege-Analyticity, but not Carnap-Analyticity. Carnap-
Analyticity is a  form of implicit definition, where the meanings of the 
terms are defined in use. but what of the conventionalism and anti-
realism typically associated with such views? one sets up such definitions 
by social decision (conventionalism) and so it seems to be anchored in 
social practice rather in ‘the world’ (anti-realism). boghossian denies 
that a defender of an implicit definition has to be necessarily committed 
to such views. Against conventionalism boghossian holds the view that 
certain inferences are found to be primitively compelling, for example 
modus ponens. There is not a conventional free for all, but our practices 
are rationally constrained – to go against them is to be irrational. Against 
anti-realism is his claim that what grounds these implicit definitions is 
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reference to the logical objects which make such inferences valid. So, 
for example, the negation sign operates by referring to a certain kind of 
logical object, which governs the inferences we use. Whatever the details 
of boghossian’s exegesis of Quine and others, the position he defends 
is one which appeals to metaphysical objects to ground logical inference 
and to the reference relation as the link between mind and world. There is 
genuine a priori knowledge available through reflection on the conditions 
of meaning. He dismisses the approach to the a priori which relies on 
rational intuition as mystificatory and ‘flash-grasping’.
bonJour and boghossian have a number of things in common. They 
think that Quine’s naturalistic position ends up in skepticism (about 
reason and about meaning, respectively). They believe there is genuine 
substantive a priori knowledge possible. A priori knowledge is realist, in 
that it connects up with the deep metaphysical structure of reality. They 
differ in their accounts of that deep metaphysical nature – bonJour being 
broadly Aristotelian and boghossian being Platonist. They also differ in 
the mode of access to this reality. bonJour relies on rational intuition. 
boghossian relies on basic inferential practices which confer meaning on 
the syncategorematic terms of our sentences. boghossian is dismissive of 
rational intuition, relying on the Wittgensteinian notion of practice and 
the un-Wittgensteinian notion of logical object.14 
The weak element of bonJour’s case is the raw appeal to rational 
intuition which seems pre-linguistic and mystificatory. In a symposium 
discussion of his work this is a  challenge which recurs – including 
a  contribution by boghossian.15 The weak element in boghossian’s 
position is the ad hoc nature of his Platonism, the appeal to logical objects 
(and he faces the standard objections to metaphysical Platonism). So, 
perhaps a  response to Quine is possible in which a) rational intuition 
is drawn closer to language and practice, and b) where the account of 
reference of basic logical terms is not Platonized? It seems that Aquinas’s 
account of meaning supplies exactly this.
14 Wittgenstein described as the Grundgedanke (fundamental thought) of the Tractatus 
the claim that the logical connectives were not referring expressions – 4.0312.
15 book Symposium on bonJour’s In Defense of Pure Reason in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 63 (3) (Nov 2001), p. 625ff
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IV. AQuINAS oN meANING
In this section I  wish to outline the elements of Aquinas’s account of 
meaning, discuss how synonymy and analyticity can be accommodated 
within it, show how the basic explanatory work about conceptual 
connection is being done by real natures with their modal properties and 
draw comparisons with the views of bonJour and boghossian.
Aquinas inherits the Aristotelian account of the relationship of 
language, mind and reality.16 A significant feature of this account is 
the linking together of semantics and cognition – the story about 
meaning is internally connected to the story about knowing and cannot 
be treated independently of each other. It is also a  realist account, in 
that mind and world are closely connected, problems about piercing 
the veil of appearance, knowing other minds and skepticism about the 
external world do not arise. As in Putnam’s brain in the vat challenge 
to skepticism, the conditions of meaning are intrinsically connected 
to the way the world is, such that skepticism cannot even be clearly 
articulated.17 Hence a root assumption is that things in the environment 
of the thinker are capable of being known by her. Aquinas has a detailed 
account of how this happens, the details of which I shall pass over here. 
However, a key element in this account is that there is a metaphysical 
link between the structures which exist in the world and the person who 
knows them. That is, the forms which exist in the world come to exist 
in the soul of the person thinking about them. The same form exists 
in the world and in the thinker. He needs a  psychological account of 
how this is possible and speaks of the passiones animae – the capacities 
in  the soul and the processes it undergoes which allows for this kind 
of cognition. The process by which the soul grasps intelligible content 
from its environment is intellectus, a precondition for the further process 
of making propositions (compounding or dividing) called ratiocinatio.18 
The relationship between the passiones animae and the forms in 
objects is natural and universal. It is a basic recognitional capacity which 
16 For a  thorough discussion see John P. o’Callaghan, Thomist Realism and the 
Linguistic Turn, Notre Dame: university of Notre Dame Press, 2003, ch. 1.
17 See Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1981, ch. 1.
18 For a clear statement of this see the ‘Prooemium’ to the Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Posterior Analytics.
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allows us to identify and individuate objects in our environment. but 
the use of names is conventional. Natural languages associate labels with 
passiones animae, by the process of imposition. So in any situation where 
I recognise, say, a cat, there is a natural psychological process by which 
I recognize the kind of thing it is and a simultaneous conventional element 
where I have been trained to associate a word with that recognition. The 
temptation here is to think of this as a three-part process. The thing in the 
world causes a passio animae, which is then labelled by the word. Classical 
empiricism had such an account in the theory of ideas, which existed 
as a  representational third realm between mind and world. Such ideas 
seem to be in a realm of natural private language which is then translated 
into communicable public languages. Aquinas isn’t committed to either 
a third realm or to private language. He says ‘words refer to the things 
they signify through the mediation of a conception in the intellect’.19 The 
crucial word here is ‘ratio’ – conception. This is the intelligible content 
of the thought held by the thinker. It is the means by which the object in 
the world is thought by her. There are two elements in cognition – the 
object cognized and the cognizer. The alteration to the cognizer caused 
by the apprehension of the object has a kind of character, a way of being 
thought about. This is the ratio – so it is not a third thing itself, but rather 
is the way by which the cognizer grasps the thing known. The way in 
which a knower develops in cognition can parallel the grasp of natural 
language in the way developmental psychologists tell us. Knowledge is 
socially inculcated, involving training in recognizing and naming, with 
no need to postulate a private language. So knowing that the meaning of 
a term is linked to our capacity to recognize things in the world, doesn’t 
entail the existence of mysterious mental items as a third realm between 
entities and minds and doesn’t require a private language.
A key concept in explicating the notion of meaning for Aquinas is 
significatio. As P.V.Spade says, this notion is a  causal psychological 
term of art.20 Signification relates to the way in which things in the 
environment are knowable to the cognizer. Things in the environment 
exert a  causal influence on the knower which leads to psychological 
19 St Ia q.13 a.1
20 P.V. Spade ‘The Semantics of terms’ in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds), Cambridge: CuP, 1982.
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change. of course, causal here has multiple meanings. There is an element 
of efficient causation in terms of Quinean impingements on our sensory 
surfaces – but even that basic level is shot through with notions of formal 
causation – the transfer of formal structure from object to medium to 
sense to intellect. The signification of a  term is expressed in the ratio. 
Hence signification has to do with the realm of form, essence, intelligible 
content. 
A further term is suppositio, which is typically translated as reference. 
Standard accounts in the 13th century distinguished various kinds 
of supposition a  term might have.21 Aquinas doesn’t engage with this 
detailed kind of distinction making, but does note an important way in 
which the supposition of subject and predicate terms differ from each 
other.22 A noun in a subject place typically supposits, or stands for, an 
individual and so is concrete in its supposition. The predicate is held to 
operate more like a verb and so supposits some abstract quality which 
is applied to the subject. Thus the predicate typically supposits in an 
abstract way, requiring that there be a subject in which the quality inheres. 
by distinguishing the different modes of signification of subjects and 
predicates Aquinas can avoid the danger of Platonism, the hypostasizing 
of abstract qualities as concrete individuals – good conceptual therapy in 
the manner of Carnap or Wittgenstein.
The distinction between res significata and modus significandi does 
a lot of work for Aquinas. The res significata is typically the extra-mental 
object. The modus significandi is the way in which this is referred to 
in language. The same res may have different modi significandi, which 
includes both the conventional linguistic term and the universal passio 
animae associated with it. This distinction allows him to make intelligible, 
for example, the doctrine of divine simplicity – where a metaphysically 
simple reality is referred to using different modi significandi, yielding 
genuine, contentful, non-synonymous information about it. With this 
sketch in place of Aquinas’s views on the conditions of meaning, let’s now 
turn to questions about analyticity, modality and the a priori.
21 See, for example, lambert of Auxerre’s work, in The Cambridge Translations of Later 
Medieval Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Norman Kretzmann and eleanor Stump, (eds), 1988, 
p. 102ff.
22 St Ia q.13a.12
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Quine makes a significant statement in “two Dogmas of empiricism”, 
when he asserts that meanings are what essences became when wedded to 
the word.23 This is to dismiss meanings, since essences were clearly outré 
for him. However, after Putnam and Kripke it is once again respectable 
to allow real natural kinds with their own metaphysical natures which 
exert a causal influence on meaning. And meanings, rather than being 
free-floating conventions constituted by linguistic fiat, are shaped and 
governed by the deep structures of the things they are connected to. 
The conventional element is there in natural languages, but also non-
conventional elements in our thinking about them, fixed by the real 
features of objects.
Aquinas discusses the ways in which subjects and predicates relate 
to each other in sentences. In some sentences there is an internal 
connection between subject and predicate, such that the ratio of the 
subject involves the ratio of the predicate. recall that the ratio is the 
intelligible content of the term and that this is fixed by the real nature 
referred to. So whether the subject and predicate are linked or not is 
fixed by the world. Subjects may necessarily involve the predicate – if 
they are involved in their definition. Scott macDonald usefully points 
out that definitions are not primarily linguistic, but are real structures in 
reality which get expressed linguistically.24 Thus, for Aquinas, scientia or 
knowledge is both a propositional attitude of individuals and an objective 
set of propositions matching the real structure of the world. When in 
a  sentence a  subject includes its predicate within itself, this is a  real, 
necessary, feature determined by the nature of the entity. If it excludes 
it this is also a  necessary feature. otherwise, there is a  contingent 
connection between subject and predicate. (Note that this is not simply 
the distinction between substantial and accidental prediction, since there 
can be necessary accidents.) 
Also, there is a  robust distinction drawn between the order of 
knowledge and the order of being. Whether or not subjects are necessarily 
connected to predicates holds whether or not this is known to us. So some 
propositions may be self-evident in themselves, in that the predicate is 
23 W.V. Quine, “two Dogmas of empiricism”, p. 22.
24 See Scott macDonald, “Theory of Knowledge” in N. Kretzmann and e. Stump (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1993.
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objectively included in the subject, but unknown to us. Aquinas believes 
that God’s existence is of this kind. God’s existence is necessary and if we 
knew God’s essence we would see this, but God’s essence is in principle 
inaccessible to us. Knowledge of some necessary connections is yielded 
by empirical research into the real features of things – for example that 
water is H2o. other necessary connections are revealed by reflection and 
dialectic and so are gained in an a priori fashion, but always rooted in 
a connection to real kinds. 
logical and mathematical knowledge is also necessary, but traces the 
connections between mental conceptions, or second intentions. but even 
these are rooted in the real metaphysical features of reality. The principle 
of non-contradiction, which is fundamental to our reasoning, relies on 
the non-compossibility of contradictories. This rests on the impossibility 
of being and not-being in the same respect at the same time. This 
principle cannot be argued for demonstratively on pain of circularity, but 
can be defended by showing the absurdity of denying it. So, necessary 
connections exist as a real feature of the concrete individuals of distinct 
kinds in the world. Necessary connections also exist in our thought 
about them insofar as our thought faithfully mirrors those real features 
and in the structural features of our thought, logic and mathematics. 
Thus the explanatory bedrock for Aquinas is his account of real kinds 
in reality which exhibit modal properties in themselves. Thought tracks 
these structures to the extent it can and the language we use reflects these 
structures. Analytic propositions are those whose subjects and predicates 
are connected by virtue of relations of second intention – logical and 
mathematical relations. Synthetic propositions are those whose subject 
and predicate are connected by relations of first intentions, relations of 
real kinds. Knowledge of the former is always by reflection. The latter 
may be by reflection or by empirical inquiry. 
Thus, Aquinas gives a way of making the analytic-synthetic distinction, 
explains conceptual containment by reduction to real definitions and 
gives an account of intentionality based on formal identity. He avoids 
conventionalism and gives a realist grounding to definition, synonymy 
and linguistic usage. like bonJour he appeals to rational intuition and 
defends it both through appeal to phenomenology and dialectically. 
but he also connects the cognitive grasp of logical primitives with their 
linguistic usage. Thus the direction of explanation is from intellect 
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to behaviour. our primitive logical apparatus tracks genuine truth-
preserving features exhibited by the formal aspects of thought. He is akin 
to boghossian in treating language as important, but connecting it to 
cognition and avoiding platonistic metaphysics.
opposition to this approach comes by claiming it is mystificatory.25 
Without the background conceptual scheme of a metaphysics using form 
and formal causation the story doesn’t make a  lot of sense - and such 
a  conceptual scheme isn’t very prevalent in contemporary discussions. 
However, recent work by John o’Callaghan and Jonathan Jacobs serves 
to make one reconsider the theoretical resources of such a  position. 
o’Callaghan analyses and defends Thomas’s semantic triangle and argues 
for its strength.26 Jacobs argues that Aquinas’s concept externalism has 
the resources for a  non-skeptical solution to such issues as Quine’s 
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, Goodman’s grue paradox and 
Kripke’s plus-quus paradox.27 In each case the puzzle arises about how to 
explain normativity about concept use and Jacobs argues that Aquinas 
avoids the skeptical pitfalls. Such engagements seem fruitful, working out 
in detail the ways in which Aquinas’s position can tackle certain kinds of 
contemporary challenge.
CoNCluSIoN
I began by saying that Aquinas’s response to the problem of naturalism 
is to restate his account of the hierarchy of sciences and the need for 
metaphysics and that such a  response would be underwhelming to 
naturalists. What I hope to have shown is that contemporary naturalism 
grew out of a debate about conceptual relations and a cluster of debates 
about linguistic rules, the foundations of logic and the relationship of 
language to the world and that Aquinas’s views on these issues are germane 
to contemporary debates. Given his basic commitments to realism, 
natural kinds and externalism about mental content, his work can be seen 
25 See for example the discussion in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 63, 
no. 3 (Nov 2001), p. 625ff.
26 See o’Callaghan op. cit. passim.
27 Jonathan Jacobs, “Habits, Cognition and realism” in John Haldane (ed.), Mind, 
Metaphysics and Value in the Thomistic and Anaytical Traditions, Notre Dame: university 
of Notre Dame Press, 2002, pp. 109-124.
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as genuinely engaging with the type of philosophical problems central to 
contemporary discussion. His work has been relegated by those under 
the influence of Hume and Kant who reject such realism and externalism. 
Given the resurgence of metaphysics in the analytic tradition, these kinds 
of objection to his work seem less cogent.
What then of Aquinas’s project of arguing for God’s existence? In this 
paper I have shown that his work on cognition, on conceptual relations 
and on the analytic-synthetic distinction provide important ways of 
challenging an objection to this project. Whether his actual arguments 
for God’s existence are in any way plausible is another issue. but the 
burden of this paper is to undermine one influential objection to even 
considering such a question.
